Discussion of Aircraft Kill Claims

This information was emailed to me by Bill Talbott, Major, USMC (Ret) in response to item #5 on the WW II History bit. He has given me permission to share it here.

#5 Not that bombers were helpless. A B-17 carried 4 tons of bombs and 1.5 tons of machine gun ammo. The US 8th Air Force shot down 6,098 fighter planes, 1 for every 12,700 shots fired.

I would like to offer some comments regarding your entry on the number of Luftwaffe fighters shot down by 8th Air Force bomber crews. The number cited was most likely "Claims". Most of these were later changed to confirmed kills by Air Corps intelligence BUT they knew the numbers were exaggerated by around 400+%. The reason for the over-claiming (a problem for all Air Forces in the war) were many-some technical, some political.

Technical

1. After some limited experimentation, and inspection of downed bombers, the Luftwaffe discovered in 1942 that the tactic that would yield the most success against a US bomber box bristling with M2.50 cal MG's was a head-on pass. It was simple. Bomber armament was weakest in the nose position. Additionally, the high closing speed limited the fighter's exposure to defensive fire (it also made the target solution difficult with only a 3-6 second window for an accurate burst). The Air Corps later added chin turrets to their B-17's and nose turrets for their B-34's and this made the Luftwaffe's fighter jock's job even hairier.
2. Doctrine called for this head on pass to be accompanied by a climbing turn out of the attack box and a sweeping turn around to the front for another pass. The reality was that at 25K altitude the ME-109, and particularly the un-supercharged FW190, was struggling. Often a climbing turn was out of the question; especially if they bled off any speed with evasive maneuvers post firing pass. The presence of any escort fighters made an attempt at a sluggish climbing turn a sure guarantee to ride the silk down. Thus, the most common attack was a head pass followed by a half roll and dive out of the attack area. The tactical goal of the fighter pilot was to damage the bomber and have it drop out of the box where it be more easily attacked. This half roll, accompanied by the Daimler-Benz' power plant's cough of black smoke in this maneuver, made many bomber gunners think the fighter was hit and spiraling down. Also, literally dozens of gunners were shooting at the same fighter. If each gunner thought he hit it; each claimed it. Sorting that out was a monumental task for the Air Intelligence officer.

Political

1. The Luftwaffe had the absolutely worst signals intelligence security of any of the German services. We read their signals easily. Consequently, we knew as soon as the following day, how effective our defensive fire was by reading Luftwaffe maintenance availability reports. These were sent by radio in the Occupied Counties and by telephone in Germany proper. It is hard to claim we shot down 100 fighters when enemy signals traffic shows only 10 lost and 20 damaged-but that's what we did. Why? Because we wanted the crews to think they were hurting the people shooting them down. How can you ask people to take such horrendous casualties and at the same time tell them "Boys, you're only stinging them." The maintenance of this necessary deception was essential to the conduct of the campaign. Since then it has entered into WWII mythology.
2. If the kills claimed by the 8th Air Force were even 50% correct, we would have swept Luftwaffe's homeland defense force from the sky in 1943. Instead, we had to restrict bomber raids to shallow penetration after Regensburg and Schweinfurt raids so we could make well our losses and build up an escort fighter force.
3. We aren't the only ones that did it. The RAF knew their fighter pilots over-claimed victories by a factor of at least 2.5 times during the Battle of Britain. The Luftwaffe records for the same period show a factor of 2.0 over-claiming. The RAF over-claimed by a factor of 3-4 times actual Luftwaffe losses during the Channel Campaign of 1942 and again knew it. Luftwaffe technical superiority (introduction of the FW -190) and superior pilot skill levels (JG-26 in Abbeville, Lille France were the Luftwaffe's Top Guns so to speak) at that point was telling. The RAF knew that morale would collapse if the fighter jocks realized they had lost over a thousand planes and crew for negligible results. Same as the story for our Bomber crews a year later.

Anyway, I really liked your site. Lots of good information in a very readable format. Well done!

Semper Fidelis
Bill Talbott
Major, USMC (Ret)

"The nation that makes a great distinction between its scholars and its warriors
will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done by fools."
Thucydides, (460-400BC)
Athenian Historian and General in the Peloponnesian Wars